

# After Brexit: An agenda for public services in Wales

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Gwasanaethau Cyhoeddus Cymru  
Wales Public Services



## **Poverty and growth in Wales today**

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## Summary

The impact of Brexit extends into all aspects of public services in Wales. This paper explores how Brexit could affect their workforce, their legislative framework and regulation, and their financing. It then considers how Brexit might affect the wider environment in which public services operate, including the local economy, demand for services and community relationships.

In each section we make specific suggestions about further action that the Welsh Government and public service providers could take to help meet the challenges and make the most of the opportunities. Some general themes emerge, which are:

- There is a great deal more that the Welsh public sector could do to ensure it is prepared, including:
  - Strengthening its evidence base
  - Systematically assessing risks and opportunities
  - Developing contingency and action plans to manage and mitigate the risks and grasp opportunities.
  
- To support public sector preparations, the Welsh Government could:
  - communicate in greater depth and more widely
  - provide robust frameworks within which public bodies should undertake their preparation
  - encourage and support innovative solutions to challenges such as skills shortages and changing trade patterns
  - consider possible changes to re-patriated legislation post-Brexit
  
- To address the lack of capacity and reluctance to commit resources to planning the Welsh Government could:
  - As a matter of principle the Welsh Government should seek additional resources from the UK government to enable Wales to prepare for Brexit.
  - Indicate that it expects public bodies to prepare contingency plans.

## 1. Introduction

Almost all the public debate about Brexit has been about migration and trade – there has been little if any discussion about the implications for public services in Wales. Yet over the last forty years of membership of the European Union, its legislation, funding and latterly its citizens have become an integral part of the provision of public services to the people of Wales. Leaving the EU in less than 18 months could therefore bring rapid and substantial change to the operation of Wales' public services.

Brexit brings both threats and opportunities to organisations in the public sector. A great deal is unknown at the moment, with no clarity about the terms of the UK's departure, limited understanding about how businesses and individuals might respond, and concerns about of the UK government's intentions in respect of repatriated legislation after Brexit and devolved powers.

In these circumstances, the challenge is to manage uncertainty and be prepared for potentially rapid change at the same time as exploring the opportunities to deliver Welsh public services differently. What is very clear is that uncertainty does not mean 'do nothing'.

The Bevan Foundation is working with Wales Public Services 2025 to identify how public services could respond to Brexit. This paper builds on Wales Public Services 2025's briefing on the possible impact of Brexit on public services to set out an agenda for action<sup>1</sup>. Many of the issues were then explored and discussed with senior stakeholders from a range of public services at a forum on 19th October 2017. Their views are developed and taken forward in this paper, although the conclusions and suggestions do not necessarily reflect their position and are those of the Bevan Foundation and Wales Public Services 2025 alone.

This paper looks at three key areas: first, the possible direct effects of Brexit on public sector organisations; second, the possible effects of Brexit on the populations they serve; and third, organisations' preparedness for change. Some consistent themes emerge across these three areas:

- organisations' ability to assess the risks and opportunities and to produce contingency plans;
- leadership, guidance and information to enable organisations to undertake contingency planning;
- the development of innovative and forward-looking responses to the risks and opportunities;
- the capacity and skills to do so.

With Brexit less than 18 months away the need for planning and action is urgent – we hope our suggestions trigger progress.

## 2. Direct Effects

Over more than forty years of the UK's membership of the European Union, the EU has become deeply embedded in the everyday business of public bodies. Whether it is legislation on how organisations conduct their activities, such as the terms on which they employ staff or how they buy their supplies, or regulation of the services they provide, such as amount of waste that must be recycled or the medicines that can be prescribed, there are EU requirements to be observed. More recently, citizens from other EU countries have become an integral part of the public sector workforce.

This section of the report identifies three key areas of change which need consideration in Wales:

- Workforce – how will public services secure a skilled workforce after Brexit?
- Legislation and regulation – how should the legislation affecting public services change after Brexit?
- Public finances – the financial implications of Brexit for public services and how they might respond?

### 2.1 Workforce

The future employment of EU nationals working in public services in Wales is unclear. In part it depends on the status afforded to EU nationals, which is still being debated (see below), and also on the UK Government's commitment to reduce net migration to 100,000 including students. The latter could, in practical terms, reduce in-migration to Wales to zero. The Welsh Government is arguing that it should have a role in shaping future migration to Wales to ensure that public services can continue to recruit from the EU, but the devolved voice may not be influential at UK level.

Even if EU nationals can continue to work in Welsh public services, whether they actually do so will depend on job-specific factors such as pay, recognition of qualifications and prospects and on other factors such as a welcoming environment and the rights of family members.

The Welsh Government estimates that a total of 9,100 EU nationals work in health and social care, education and public administration<sup>2</sup>. A further 1,900 work in construction, which includes social housing. The largest proportions of EU workers is in higher education, where one in ten staff is an EU national, and in health care, where one in twenty health professionals is an EU national. The proportion of EU workers in social care is lower, estimated at 3 per cent<sup>3</sup>. Some specific occupations have particularly high proportions of EU workers – vets and dentists were both mentioned.

There are already signs that Brexit is directly affecting recruitment. The Health Foundation has reported a 96 per cent decrease in the number of nurses from the EU registering to practise in the UK since July 2016<sup>4</sup> and the Nursing and Midwifery Council reports that the number of EU trained nurses leaving the register has increased slightly<sup>5</sup>. The risks come on top of existing challenges with recruitment – for example the Royal College of Physicians report that there are trainee vacancies in every acute hospital rota in Wales, and that in 2015/16 four out of ten consultant physician posts advertised were unfilled<sup>6</sup>.

There were also possible indirect risks from Brexit as the labour market changes. Workers, such as doctors or construction workers, who are UK nationals could be attracted to leave Wales to fill vacancies generated by the departure of EU nationals elsewhere, for example in London and the south east of England, while UK nationals currently working in social care could 'bump up' into better paid roles in the NHS exacerbating shortages in the care sector.

It was clear that there are major gaps in information about the number of EU nationals in the workforce. In some public services, such as social care and local government, the numbers of EU nationals are simply not known. There is more information available in other services – in the NHS the Electronic Staff Record (ESR) enables EU nationals to be identified by employer and by occupational group. However, there are 35,000 individuals for whom no nationality is recorded. In addition the ESR suggests that a much smaller proportion of the total workforce is EU nationals (1.55 per cent) than government statistics estimate, which adds to uncertainty. Where organisations do collect and share information about their workforce, e.g. to record unfilled vacancies, we were told that there are many different definitions in use. This makes using the information difficult.

If the UK Government's proposals for 'settled status' are agreed, then only those resident in Wales for five years or more will have rights to live and work in Wales. Those resident for fewer than five years will need to secure 'leave to remain' status and those who arrive after an as yet unspecified date will have a 'grace period'. While most employers can identify the duration of employment of their employees few if any know the length of time an employee has been resident in the UK.

That said, there remains a significant risk from the loss of EU citizens from the workforce at all levels. Not only is there a risk of vacancies being left unfilled, creating difficulties delivering services, there is a wider loss of knowledge and expertise from all sectors of public service.

Our discussions suggest that plans to manage and mitigate the possible impact of Brexit are, at best, at an early stage. In the NHS, we were told it was difficult to know how much resource should be allocated to contingency planning given the uncertainty about the status of EU nationals in the future and the limited influence of the Welsh Government in negotiations, although a working group would be established shortly. The uncertainty meant that social care, construction and local government were in a similar position.

Some changes are in train which could ease future workforce difficulties. In health, the Welsh Government is establishing a new body, Health Education and Improvement Wales, to co-ordinate workforce planning and training in general, not just as a response to Brexit. However, it will not be operational until April 2018 and it will be several years before any increase in the supply of qualified health professionals come on stream. The registration of health professionals is not devolved and so is not within the Welsh Government's powers. In the shorter term, the Nursing and Midwifery Council is changing the proof of English language competence required from nurses and midwives trained outside the EU which might ease recruitment and is also considering a change in the standards for competence for registered nurses. In higher education, universities hope that continued involvement in EU research and development networks will enable them to retain some EU staff.

There are opportunities to adjust post-Brexit migration policy so it better fits Wales' needs. For example, BMA Wales said that shortage occupations here are not necessarily the same as in the rest of the UK, but as previous attempts to get health roles in Wales – such as GPs – included in the shortage occupation list had not been successful it is unclear if it is an option in the future. Other changes such as increasing the speed at which visa applications are processed is also an option.

To sum up, the uncertainty surrounding the Brexit deal, the location of many of the relevant powers at UK rather than devolved level, and the pressure on resources makes assessing the likely impact of Brexit on the public service workforce and managing its impact very difficult.

**This makes it all the more important for the Welsh Government to ensure public services are in the strongest possible position by:**

- reiterating its commitment to enable EU nationals in the public sector workforce to remain in Wales;
- communicating the latest developments on Brexit widely and effectively with public sector bodies;
- providing clear leadership and guidance to public sector bodies about making contingency plans;
- working with public sector bodies to develop innovative solutions to potential workforce shortages.

**There is also scope for public sector organisations to:**

- ensure they have consistent and accurate information about the number and roles of EU nationals in their workforce, and that they are monitoring trends in recruitment and turnover;
- develop contingency plans to manage possible losses of EU nationals in the workforce especially in critical occupations;
- work with Welsh Government and non-devolved bodies where appropriate to develop innovative solutions to current and new labour shortages.

## **2.2 Legislation and regulation**

The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill proposes transferring all EU legislation into UK law, including legislation that affects devolved responsibilities. Public services are very significantly shaped by EU legislation and regulation, and could well face significant challenges if legislation is changed post-Brexit.

The Welsh Government has expressed grave concern that EU legislation that affects devolved fields will be not be devolved to the National Assembly for Wales. Some public service organisations were concerned that they would not be able to influence any changes to UK legislation in future, including changes that affect devolved responsibilities as well as changes in reserved powers e.g. over cyber security, health and safety, employment rights and consumer protection to name but a few.

At present, there is no indication of which, if any, repatriated legislation could change. Many politicians in favour of Brexit have advocated significant de-regulation once powers return to the UK, for example of environmental regulations and employment law. However, the likelihood of significant change depends on the nature of any trade deal reached with the EU – a close relationship would probably require the UK to comply with the vast majority of EU legislation.

The impact of legislative uncertainty should not be underestimated. Local authorities in particular were concerned that possible ‘gaps’ in legislation during transitions could leave them exposed to the risk of acting outside their powers. This issue could be addressed by local authorities having a general power of competence which would not only ‘cover’ any legislative holes that may emerge, but which may also encourage them to be more proactive.

The possibility of change raised concerns about forward planning, capacity and influence. In terms of forward planning, we heard that local authorities need to know if the targets for waste recycling will be maintained at the EU rates in order to plan investment in waste disposal facilities. Similarly, in construction, housing providers need to know if energy efficiency and other standards will be maintained.

Capacity to deal with changes was a particular concern for public procurement regulations and consumer protection, although all public services are stretched. Public procurement already experiences skills gaps and shortages, with striking differences in performance between organisations. The question was asked ‘can the service cope with changes that might be needed?’ Similarly, consumer protection services and advice are based on an extensive framework of EU legislation and are already struggling to keep up with demand.

There was an additional concern about the impact of Brexit on public bodies which are already in contracts with suppliers in other EU member states. The numbers were thought to be modest but it is simply not known how much procurement is currently undertaken through EU rules, and whether there were possible contractual issues after Brexit.

In terms of the provisions of EU legislation, most public service organisations wanted to broadly retain the status quo, not least as it is the basis on which they have been delivering services for some years. To illustrate, health organisations’ workforce planning takes the European Working Time Directive into account and they would wish to retain its provisions. In addition much EU legislation was seen as being based on sound evidence and principles and should be retained, such as that on health and safety, food safety, public health and health technology.

An added concern was that the uncertainty surrounding the changes in legislation and regulation could increase the risk of scams of consumers who may be persuaded that their rights have changed.

Public service organisations identified some limited, relatively minor changes that they would like to see in repatriated EU legislation, mostly reducing ‘red tape’, e.g. in relation to licensing, procurement and state aids. However these were not thought-through positions and there were no worked-up proposals for change. It was suggested that the challenges and opportunities of Brexit could be a catalyst for the



wider reform of procurement for example through joint planning and commissioning of services.

The European Union (Withdrawal) Bill is still at an early stage at the time of writing, and the position in respect of legislation affecting devolved responsibilities remains to be resolved. At the same time, public bodies need some certainty about the future legislative framework in which they must operate if they are to plan and deliver services effectively.

Building on its legislative analysis so far, we suggest that the Welsh Government should:

- Set out the EU legislation that significantly affects public services and identify where changes to legislation could have the greatest impact on the stability and delivery of services;
- Limit the immediate uncertainties for public services by affirming that it will seek after Brexit to maintain the provisions of current EU legislation for the rest of the Assembly term;
- Consider the benefits of a power of general competence for local authorities;
- Put in train a review, working with stakeholders, to identify where they might wish to make changes to inherited – EU legislation in the longer term.

## **2.3 Public Finances**

The WPS briefing paper identifies three ways in which Brexit could affect public finances:

- a. the medium-term impact of Brexit on the UK economy and hence public finances as a whole
- b. what happens to UK – EU fiscal transfers and
- c. possible changes in policies on public finances and debt reduction as a result of Brexit.

In terms of the impact on the economy, the UK Government's current fiscal policy and the grim economic forecast from the Office for Budget Responsibility, do not encourage optimism that economic prospects post-Brexit will result in significant growth in tax revenues and day-to-day spending on public services any time soon. Although the Chancellor may apply some sticking plaster where crisis threatens, public services should probably anticipate continued pressure on their budgets not only to 2020 but very possibly thereafter.

There could also be an impact on devolved tax revenues which are expected to contribute about 20 per cent of the Welsh Government's budget by 2020. Brexit could bring changes in the income tax base as well as in earnings, and so could have a marked effect on forecast revenues. In Scotland, the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA) estimate that Brexit could result in a reduction to the Scottish Government budget of between 6 and 13 per cent by 2030 from a fall in income tax revenues<sup>7</sup>.

There are also consequences from the loss of EU fiscal transfers. The arrangements in respect of the UK Shared Prosperity Fund which replaces the European Structural and Investments Funds remain to be seen, as do the arrangements in respect of other EU funds such as support for agriculture, investment in research and development and access to loans such as those from the European Investment Bank. The Welsh Government is arguing that the UK government should maintain investment to Wales at EU levels. Any other arrangements, including allocating a 'Barnett' share to Wales, could result in significant loss of funding for a large range of activities, putting even more pressure on the Welsh budget.

And of course there is the question about what, if anything, will happen to the UK's current contribution to the EU budget and what might be redirected towards the NHS and other public services. Given the range of uncertainties and controversy about campaign commitments, a useful judgement about the probabilities is almost impossible.

While the focus in Wales has been on the possible loss of EU funds coming to Wales, the UK also contributes to the EU budget. In the short-term, the UK Government is engaged in negotiating a single financial settlement (the 'divorce bill'). Although the subject of much political speculation and debate, the terms are not known at the time of writing. As CIPFA Scotland notes, there has been no debate to date on whether the UK Government will apply a share of the liabilities to devolved administrations.

Last, it is of course by no means certain that the current commitments in respect of public finances will continue into the 2020s. The UK Government's objective of a balanced budget has already slipped and its objectives may change again. Some politicians' vision of the UK as a low tax – low spending country could bring much more radical changes to public finances. The Welsh Government and almost all public services operate within relatively short time horizons and within the budget allocated to them, i.e. currently up to 2020 for day-to-day spending. With public finances beyond that dependent on many different factors, it is understandable that public service organisations are reluctant to contemplate either substantial cuts to or major increases in future budgets that may well not take effect. Nevertheless, we suggest that there is merit in considering different scenarios for public finances in Wales after Brexit including scenarios at different ends of the spending spectrum. In light of these and other pressures on public spending, it may well be appropriate for the Welsh Government to work with stakeholders to prepare contingency plans.

### **3. INDIRECT EFFECTS**

As well as impacts on the public sector as organisations, Brexit could change the characteristics and needs of the populations they serve. It is difficult to forecast these changes with any degree of accuracy, because they not only depend on the agreement reached between the UK and the EU and in due course the UK and other countries but they also depend on the behaviours of individuals and businesses. Nevertheless, we suggest that public sector bodies should be aware of the potential areas of change and be ready to respond as required.

We have identified that the key areas of indirect effects are:

- a. Changes in the local economy and trade
- b. Changes in the population from migration
- c. Changes in the community relationships

### **3.1 Local economy**

The impact of Brexit on the economy is far from clear. Most mainstream economists anticipate that UK output will fall by at least 1 percent with a soft Brexit and by more than 2 per cent in the event of a 'hard' Brexit. In reality, much depends on the terms of the trade deal reached between the UK and the EU and between the UK and other countries as well as the value of sterling and the responses of businesses themselves.

The impact on the local economy is even more difficult to anticipate, with some economists suggesting that Wales and other areas outside the south-east of England will be hit hardest whilst others suggest the opposite. It is reasonable to expect that the risks of an adverse impact are greatest where the local economy is dominated by a limited number of employers or sectors – whether it is metal manufacture or aircraft components. Here, a decision to wind-down or even close a plant following Brexit could have major consequences.

There could also be effects on Wales from changes elsewhere. For example, the decision on the nature of the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland could affect flows of goods and services through Wales, with implications for ports, port-related employment, customs and similar services, and traffic flows<sup>9</sup>.

Changes in the local economy will affect public services by possible loss of revenue (including business rates), changes in demand for sites and premises, changes in the support needed by businesses and possible changes in transport patterns to name but a few.

Local authorities in particular need to assess the possible impact of Brexit on their local economy and support businesses to adapt. This should include building the evidence base, for example:

- identifying companies which export to the EU either directly or as suppliers to other businesses which export,
- identifying companies which rely on imports from the EU as a significant part of their supply chain,
- identifying businesses which are dependent on workers from the EU, either in skilled or unskilled roles.

Local authorities could then ensure that their local and regional economic development strategies enable businesses to develop new export markets, source alternative supplies, fill potentially new skills gaps and boost, crucially, boost productivity. As part of this they should articulate clear 'asks' of the Welsh and UK governments, with – at a very minimum – regular updates on emerging trade positions.

## 3.2 Migration

The status of the 80,000 European Economic Area and Swiss citizens who currently live in Wales is as yet unknown. The UK Government's proposals could, if agreed, enable about 50,000 to secure 'settled status' and so remain in Wales if they wish, but the 30,000 people who are estimated to have arrived in the last five years would need to seek 'leave to remain' pending five years' legal residency. Contrary to the popular picture of the single migrant worker, many EU citizens have families in Wales, with an estimated 20,000 children – 4 per cent of all children – living in households where at least one parent is an EU citizen<sup>10</sup>.

Whether EU citizens continue to live in Wales depends not only on their legal status post-Brexit but also a range of other factors such as the strength of the economy and individual preferences. The uncertainty about their status is reported to be generating a high level of migration-related enquiries to advice agencies, with demand potentially increasing as future migration policy is confirmed.

EU citizens have had an impact for demand for some public services. While the impact UK- and Wales-wide is said to be very modest, not least because of the demographic profile of most migrants, there are more effects in the areas where EU citizens are concentrated geographically. This includes demand for education (notably in faith-based schools) and for social housing. In Wrexham, for example, EU migration is a factor in more than 1,200 school children identifying as having a nationality other than Welsh, British or English (8 per cent of all pupils who stated a national identity), with 6.5 per cent of pupils identifying in this way in Merthyr Tydfil<sup>11</sup>. In higher education, demand from EU citizens for its services has been actively encouraged by Wales' institutions.

The number of EU citizens living in social housing in Wales is not known but in England and Wales as a whole 3 per cent of social housing lettings are reported to be to EU citizens. The proportion is likely to vary widely depending on local demand for housing and levels of migration. In Merthyr Tydfil, for example, where there has been a relatively high level of EU migration and low demand for social housing (compared with other areas), local social landlords support a Polish community group because of the presence of EU citizens amongst their tenants. However the demand should not be overstated – a freedom of information request revealed that around 10 per cent of households on the social housing waiting list were EU nationals (129 households of EU origin compared with 1,246 British households)<sup>12</sup>.

The impact on demand for health services is reported to be more limited, primarily because of the age-profile of EU citizens.

Two issues arise from possible changes in the migration status of EU citizens. First, an exodus could reduce demand for some public services in some areas, resulting for example in short-term surplus school or higher education places or social housing vacancies. Second, the Welsh Government and public service providers will need to consider the rights of EU citizens after Brexit to access the Welsh NHS, education, social housing and other devolved public services. This is particularly important in respect of EU citizens who may not qualify for 'leave to remain' immediately.

Just as EU citizens may leave Wales, UK citizens living in the EU could return. In 2010/11 an estimated 900,000 UK citizens lived in other EU member states. The number who are from Wales is unknown, but if it is pro-rata to Wales' share of the UK population there could be 45-50,000 people of Welsh origin living in other EU countries. Their rights to remain in other EU countries and to benefit for example from reciprocal health care are currently not known. Should significant numbers of UK citizens return and take up residence in Wales there could be implications for housing, health and social care services in particular.

The uncertainty about future migration rights of both EU and UK citizens should not deter public bodies in Wales from identifying how Brexit might affect their local population. We suggest that:

- In the short-term, public bodies need to be prepared for enquiries about EU citizens' rights to remain in Wales
- The Welsh Government and other public service providers need to consider eligibility for access to services
- Public bodies need to anticipate changes in demand for services, and in education and housing in particular.

### **3.3 Community relationships**

Brexit is widely reported to have had a negative effect on 'community cohesion' with increases in hate crime against EU citizens as well as anecdotal evidence of poor relationships in the community between the existing population and those believed to be from outside the UK.

Community cohesion is one of the goals of the Well-being of Future Generations Act although it is not clear how it is being delivered in future as the Welsh Government's community cohesion delivery plan is only for 2016/17 and had a mixed reception. As such a clear statement of intent and a framework for action would help statutory and voluntary bodies to address existing and future problems associated with integrating people from different backgrounds.

We therefore suggest that the Welsh Government should:

- publish a new strategy and action plan to address all aspects of cohesion and integration as a matter of urgency;
- ensure that all public bodies are aware of the need to foster good community relationships in Wales.

## **4. PREPARATION AND PLANNING**

Given the very significant uncertainty, it is clearly difficult for public sector bodies to respond to specific changes that may lie ahead. Nevertheless, with potentially major changes in the workforce in some services, possible wholesale deregulation in some areas and uncertainty about the future of public finances an assessment of risks and the preparation of plans to manage them seems prudent. There is, in addition, a

reasonable expectation that public sector bodies should be preparing for changes in the wider environment, including their local economy, composition of the local population and community relationships.

Our discussion with stakeholders suggested that most public service organisations in Wales are at a very early stage of assessing the risks and opportunities and that none yet have contingency plans in preparation. A comparison with preparations elsewhere in the UK is outside the scope of this project but it does appear that a number of public sector bodies in, for example, Scotland, the West of England and the West Midlands are taking the initiative by identifying the evidence base, undertaking impact assessments and preparing appropriate strategies.

The main reasons for this are, first, a lack of information and, second, a lack of resources. Most organisations said that they have had limited information from the Welsh Government on Brexit. Within Welsh Government, engagement with stakeholders is variable between departments, being relatively established in environment and agriculture, for example, and less so in others. Some stakeholders utilised information they received from the UK Government via networks such as the Cavendish Collaboration (in health) or their sister organisations in London (such as the Local Government Association or National Housing Federation).

The public service umbrella bodies were aware of the Welsh Government's statements on Brexit to date, but the statements were more focused on addressing the UK position and were not specific to individual public services nor did they necessarily reach into the organisations delivering services on the ground. In the absence of clarity, the clear impression is that the vast majority of organisations are essentially waiting.

On top of this, organisations that are already under severe financial pressures felt unable to commit substantial resources to potentially nugatory activity. The commitment is required not only from the umbrella bodies but from individual service providers, and some activity – such as surveys of staff if required – could be time consuming to undertake.

We note that the Welsh Government itself has a relatively small team dealing with Brexit. In comparison the UK Government has created more than 2,000 new roles across government departments to deal with Brexit at a cost of £400 million, with a further 2,000 posts in the pipeline<sup>13</sup>. The November 2017 budget includes provision for a further £3 billion to be set aside for Brexit preparations over the next two years. A share – whether on Barnett principles or not – of even some of this resource could contribute to the Welsh Government's and other public bodies' preparations for Brexit.

The exception to this picture is higher education, where universities in Wales – and indeed more widely – have identified how they wish to operate on the international stage after Brexit.

With Brexit less than 18 months away we would suggest that all public sector organisations should:

- assess the risks and opportunities that may arise, both for their organisation and for the people who use their services.
- Develop suitable contingency and action plans to manage and mitigate risks and make the most of opportunities.

There is scope for the Welsh Government to play a stronger leadership role within the Welsh public sector, ensuring that it:

- communicate in greater depth with organisations across the spectrum of the public sector on Brexit policy and process,
- provides robust frameworks within which organisations can assess and prepare, for example establishing common methods and frameworks
- monitors and takes steps to mitigate the risks and opportunities identifies
- seeks additional resources from the UK government to enable Wales to prepare for Brexit.

## Notes and references

<sup>1</sup>Forthcoming

<sup>2</sup>Welsh Government (2017) Brexit and Fair Movement of People. Table 4 [https://beta.gov.wales/sites/default/files/2017-09/Brexit%20and%20Fair%20Movement%20of%20People-%28EN%29main\\_WEB.pdf](https://beta.gov.wales/sites/default/files/2017-09/Brexit%20and%20Fair%20Movement%20of%20People-%28EN%29main_WEB.pdf)

<sup>3</sup>based on comparable parts of England

<sup>4</sup>The Health Foundation (2017) New data show 96% drop in nurses from EU since July last year, 12th June. <http://www.health.org.uk/news/new-data-show-96-drop-nurses-eu-july-last-year>

<sup>5</sup>Nursing and Midwifery Council (2017) Report on EU nurses and midwives - Nurses and midwives on our register <https://www.nmc.org.uk/globalassets/sitedocuments/special-reports/nmc-eu-report-june-2017.pdf>

<sup>6</sup>Royal College of Physicians (2017) Physicians on the front line: The medical workforce in Wales in 2016 <https://www.rcplondon.ac.uk/projects/outputs/physicians-front-line-medical-workforce-wales-2016-0>

<sup>7</sup>The Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (2017) Submission to the Scottish Parliament Finance and Constitution Committee inquiry into the Impact of Brexit on the Scottish Budget. <http://www.cipfa.org/about-cipfa/press-office/latest-press-releases/the-scottish-government-must-prepare-for-fiscal-shocks-following-brexit-%E2%80%93-urges-cipfa-scotland>

<sup>8</sup>Ibid. p.21

<sup>9</sup>National Assembly for Wales External Affairs and Additional Legislation Committee (2017) Inquiry into the implications of Brexit for Welsh ports <http://www.assembly.wales/laid%20documents/cr-ld11158/cr-ld11158-e.pdf>

<sup>10</sup>Welsh Government (2017) Brexit and Fair Movement of People. Table 4 [https://beta.gov.wales/sites/default/files/2017-09/Brexit%20and%20Fair%20Movement%20of%20People-%28EN%29main\\_WEB.pdf](https://beta.gov.wales/sites/default/files/2017-09/Brexit%20and%20Fair%20Movement%20of%20People-%28EN%29main_WEB.pdf) p.13

<sup>11</sup>The proportions are higher in Cardiff, Newport and Swansea but are associated with migration from outside the EU as well as that by EU citizens.

<sup>12</sup>Merthyr Tydfil County Borough Council, Freedom of Information requests disclosure log 2016. <https://www.merthyr.gov.uk/council/data-protection-and-freedom-of-information/disclosure-log/?id=5727&>

<sup>13</sup>Haywood, Sir Jeremy (2017) How the Civil Service is preparing for Brexit, <https://civilservice.blog.gov.uk/2017/07/11/how-the-civil-service-is-preparing-for-brexit/>





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